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How persistent is civilization growth?
Timothy J. Garrett
Abstract In a recent study [7], I described theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
showing how civilization evolution might be considered from a purely physical basis. One
implication is that civilization exhibits the property of persistence in its growth. Here, this
argument is elaborated further, and specific near-term forecasts are provided for key eco-
nomic variables and anthropogenic CO2 emission rates at global scales. Absent some ex-
ternal shock, civilization wealth, energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions will
continue to grow exponentially at an average rate of about 2.3% per year.
1 Introduction
Through combustion, carbon dioxide (CO2) is emitted as a by-product of the primary energy
consumption that is used to run the economy [20]. Anthropogenic CO2 emissions accumu-
late in the atmosphere [12], and are a primary control of changes in global mean climate
[14].
Studies of the response of the atmosphere to changing greenhouse concentrations are
informed by a mixture of observations and a basic understanding of underlying processes.
The evidence is that about 40% of emitted carbon remains in the atmosphere [11,15,13].
Numerical and theoretical models, combined with paleoclimate data, point to an equilib-
rium surface temperature response to a doubling of CO2 concentrations that lies somewhere
between 2 ◦C and 4.5 ◦C [9].
Meanwhile, economic scientists consider the evolution of civilization and its emissions
to be driven by decisions made by individuals, organizations and governments [1]. The
judgement is that human perceptions and behavior control the rate at which civilization
consumes fossil energy. Policy guides sources of primary energy, rates of human reproduc-
tion, individual wealth and lifestyles, and how efficiently energy is consumed to produce
economic output [20]. Global CO2 emission trajectories are determined by these choices.
Unfortunately, there is an exceptionally broad range of CO2 emission trajectories that is
considered to be humanly plausible, and this greatly amplifies the uncertainty in the physics
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2[23]. Arguably, this is a real problem, especially if climate change becomes a negative feed-
back on economic growth [8]. If human adaptation to climate change is to be anything more
than purely responsive, constrained forecasts of global CO2 emission trajectories will cer-
tainly be needed.
In a recent paper in this journal [7], I suggested that predictability might be greatly
improved if, like climate systems, human systems were also approached from a physical
viewpoint. To this end, I proposed a thermodynamically-based framework for the evolution
of civilization wealth and its rate of energy consumption at globally integrated scales. At
the core of the prognostic model is a hypothesis that the instantaneous rate of primary en-
ergy consumption by civilization a is linked through a constant λ to its inflation-adjusted
economic value (or civilization wealth) C, where wealth is the time-integral of global eco-
nomic production (or GDP) P, adjusted for inflation at market exchange rates (MER), and
aggregated over the entirety of civilization history [16,3]
a = λC = λ
∫ t
0
P
(
t ′
)
dt ′ (1)
Taking a to be in units of Watts, and P in units of 1990 MER US dollars per second, then
wealth C has units of 1990 MER US dollars, and the constant λ has units of Watts per 1990
MER US dollar.
While this formulation is highly unorthodox from traditional economic standpoints (see
a discussion in Appendix B of Garrett (2011)), it is nonetheless transparent, and therefore
easy to test. What was found was that for the period 1970 to 2005 for which global statistics
for a were available [2], the mean value of λ amounts to 9.7 milliwatts per 1990 US dollar,
with an uncertainty in the mean at the 95% confidence level of just 0.3 milliwatts per 1990
US dollar.
It appears then that λ is indeed constant with time. This is the empirical support behind
the initial hypothesis expressed in Eq. 1, that real global economic value is an expression
of the global capacity to consume primary energy resources. More recent data extending to
2008 has not changed the value of the derived result (see Table 1 and the supplementary
material). If anything, the inter-annual variability in calculated values of λ is diminishing
with time .
Table 1 Measured values for the global rate of energy consumption a (TW), global real wealth C (trillion
1990 MER USD), the ratio λ = a/C (mW per 1990 MER USD), global real GDP P (trillion 1990 MER USD
per year) and the real growth rate η = P/C (% per year).
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
a 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.3 11.7 12.2 13.2 15.3 16.4
C =
∫ t
0 P(t
′)dt ′ 821 884 960 1048 1151 1266 1398 1536 1656
λ = a/C 8.8 9.4 10.0 9.8 10.2 9.6 9.4 9.9 9.9
P 11.5 13.9 16.8 19.2 22.3 24.8 29.3 33.6 37.1
η = P/C (% per year) 1.40 1.57 1.75 1.83 1.93 1.96 2.09 2.17 2.24
2 Precision versus predictability in economic quantities
Here, the implications of λ being constant for long-range predictability are discussed in
greater detail. The main implication is that global civilization has inertia. Eq. 1 shows
3that the current rate of energy consumption a is intrinsically determined by the entirety of
past economic productivity P, which, when adjusted for inflation, yields our current global
wealth C. Because the past is unchangeable, civilization will carry its current wealth into
the future, and also its associated rate of energy consumption a = λC. Unless there is very
rapid decay from some severe external shock, near-term reductions in energy consumption
and wealth are physically implausible. They would require civilization to somehow “forget”
its past accumulation of wealth C.
In general, the variance of any externally forced system demonstrates the property of
“reddening”, meaning that it is the most slowly evolving components of the system that
exhibit the most power. The analogy that could be drawn is to a growing child, or in fact
any other organism [18,4]. Whether the child is growing or shrinking, energy must still be
consumed to sustain all the internal circulations that have developed through prior growth of
body mass. Accident or a disease could rapidly change rates of energy consumption through
sickness and death. But otherwise, the child will tend to follow a slowly evolving growth
trajectory.
In the same manner, civilization as a whole consumes energy in order to sustain the
material flows that enable it to survive. The current capacity to consume has evolved from
the activities of our ancestors, through their creation of us, as well as their construction of
farms, towns, communication networks and machines. This past production and consump-
tion continues to enable us to consume. And, since civilization is currently very large, it
is this accumulated past that will most strongly govern our future energy consumption and
emission rates of carbon dioxide.
The growth rate of civilization and its energy consumption can be expressed in a variety
of ways, all of which follow from Eq. 1:
η = d lnadt =
d lnC
dt =
P
C
=
P∫ t
0 P(t ′)dt ′
(2)
There is currently no fundamental theory for describing what controls the evolution of η
in civilization. However, the data indicate that the growth rate η (t) evolves slowly itself.
In 2008 it reached a historical high of 2.24 % per year (Table 1), up from 1.93% per year
in 1990. It is probably a safe bet to assume that that similar growth rates will persist in the
near-term.
The point here is that persistence is an effective tool for forecasting, but most especially
when applied to ”reddened” variables like global wealth C =
∫ t
0 Pdt ′, that are highly inte-
grated over time and space. When predicting the evolution of any system, there is always a
trade-off. Integral quantities are easier to forecast, but at the sacrifice of temporal and spatial
resolution. Specifically, integration biases variability in P towards its more slowly varying
components. If
∫ t
0 Pdt ′ is much larger than P∆ t, then even wild short-term fluctuations in P
can have only limited impact on the total integral over time. Indeed, as shown in Table 1,
this is the scenario we currently experience. Annual GDP (P∆ t) is only about 2% of total
global wealth (∫ t0 Pdt ′). So even in an artificial scenario where GDP were to suddenly halve
for the next five years, it would not have a large impact on global wealth and rates of energy
consumption.
The value of examining globally and temporally integrated quantities was a point that
was largely missed in two critiques that appeared with Garrett (2011). Cullenward et al.
(2011) and Scher and Koomey (2011) argued that there cannot be a constant relationship
between energy consumption rates a and wealth C because the relationship between a and
P is highly dynamic, both temporally and between sectors/nations.
4This misrepresents the arguments in Garrett (2011) because the discussion of Eq. 1 in
Garrett (2011) was explicitly referenced, not to nations or economic sectors, but to civiliza-
tion as a whole. More importantly, Eq. 1 does not apply to P/a, but rather to the integral
quantity C/a =
∫ t
0 Pdt ′/a. Certainly, there has been past discussion among economists that
there exists a strong correlation between rates of energy consumption and economic produc-
tion at the national level (e.g., [5]). However, P and ∫ t0 Pdt ′ are not at all the same thing, and
they have no obvious relationship to one another. They might be statistically correlated, but
only if P is growing exponentially.
In fact, if λ = a/C is constant, then it is gains in “energy productivity” f = P/a that
drive global economic growth. Essentially, f is a measure of the capacity of civilization to
turn current energy consumption into its own growth, where growth enables civilization to
consume more energy in the future. Combining Eqs. 1 and 2, one finds that the growth of
wealth and energy consumption follow
η = λ f = 1
a
da
dt =
d lnC
dt (3)
Thus, contrary to what is normally assumed [20], higher energy productivity corresponds to
accelerated growth in energy consumption rates (see also [10,21,19]). Similarly, the growth
in real global GDP follows
d lnP
dt = η +
d lnη
dt ≡ λ f +
d ln f
dt (4)
For example, the mean value of f = P/a between 1970 and 2008 was 61 micro-dollars
per joule, where dollars are expressed in inflation-adjusted 1990 MER units. Thus, the mean
value of λ f for this period is 5.9×10−8 % per second or 1.87 percent per year. A linear
least-squares fit to the observed trend in f is d ln f /dt = 1.00 % yr−1. Thus, the thermody-
namically based model provides a mean calculated growth rate for world real GDP between
1970 and 2008 of d lnP/dt = 1.87 + 1.00 = 2.97 % per year. The actual observed value
based on a least-squares fit to the data is 2.90% per year. The difference between observa-
tions and theory is just two percent.
Such accuracy in the global GDP growth calculation is really just a consequence of
there being a constant factor λ relating global wealth ∫ t0 P(t)dt ′ to energy consumption
rates a (Table 1); the rest is just basic math. But, perhaps since P increased by more than a
factor of three between 1970 and 2008, this analysis might lend further reassurance that the
model is empirically validated, and that it can provide simplified forecasts of global GDP
growth without having to resort to explicit representations of nations, sectors, people or their
lifestyles1.
3 Persistence in growth
To reiterate, available statistics show that wealth, when it is integrated over the entire global
economy and integrated over the entire history of economic production, has been related
to the current rate of global primary energy consumption through a factor that has been
effectively constant over nearly four decades of civilization growth. Its implications for the
future are that civilization has inertia, and therefore its current rate of consumption growth
is unlikely to cease in a hurry.
1 In fact, it is the absence of people in the model that is the justification for evaluating fiscal quantities in
units of MER rather than purchasing power parity (PPP) currency, as has been advised [6].
5From Eq. 2, η is the rate of growth of real wealth C and energy consumption rates a.
The value of η is intrinsically tied to the energy productivity f = P/a through Eq. 3. Thus,
the rate of growth in η itself, or d lnη/dt, can be termed as the “real innovation rate” since it
corresponds to greater energy productivity. In an innovative world, the deterministic solution
for the growth of energy consumption rates a, wealth C and CO2 emission rates E (assuming
they stay tied to energy consumption rates) is of form [7]
X (t) = X0e
ητη
(
et/τη−1
)
(5)
where X refers to any of a, C, or E. X0 is some initial condition and τη is the time constant
for growth in η
τη =
1
d lnη/dt (6)
Note that the solution for X (t) (Eq. 5) condenses to the simple exponential growth form
of X = X0 expηt in the limit that innovation slows to the point that τη → ∞. If there is
innovation, however, then τη is positive and finite, and growth is super-exponential (i.e. the
exponent of an exponent).
Another way of expressing innovation and its relationship to growth is to think of
doubling-times. The doubling times δ for wealth C and growth rates η are given by
δX =
ln2
η (7)
δη =
ln2
d lnη/dt (8)
Effectively δX represents the time required for civilization to double its wealth at current
rates, and δη is the time required for the growth rate to double (or δX to halve). Thus, from
Eq. 5, a deterministic solution for growth in wealth, energy consumption or CO2 emissions
follows
X (t) = X02
δη
δX
(
2t/δη−1
)
(9)
Historical statistics for δX and δη are shown in Fig. 1. For the purpose of the calculations,
the definition of exponential growth rates is η = P/C (Eq. 2). The data show that, over the
past century or so, there has been a long term tendency for wealth to double over ever shorter
intervals. As a whole, the world is getting richer faster.
More interesting than the growth rate, however, is the innovation time, which itself
shows marked inflection points. There were two periods of particularly rapid innovation.
The first was in the late 1800s and early 1900s, when the growth rate doubled in 40 years.
Following 1950, the growth rate doubled over a remarkably short timespan of just 20 years.
For contrast, both the 1930s and the past decade have been characterized by more stag-
nant innovation, or a relaxation from super-exponential to simple exponential growth. Cur-
rently, wealth is doubling more quickly than ever before; it now takes only about 30 years
for global wealth to double. Still, for the first time since the Great Depression, the doubling
time has nearly ceased to shorten.
It is interesting to speculate as to what might be driving the variability in δη . Perhaps
it is access to important new oil reservoirs in the late 1800s and around 1950 that led to
bursts in innovation, and an absence of large discoveries is slowing real innovation today.
If so, it hints at a more fundamental thermodynamic theory for civilization evolution that
incorporates the accessibility and depletion of geological reservoirs.
650 100 150 200 250 300
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Real Wealth Doubling Time δX (Years)
R
ea
l G
ro
wt
h 
Do
ub
lin
g 
Ti
m
e δ
η 
(Y
ea
rs)
1890
1910
1930
1940
1950
1970
1985
1995
2000
2005
2007
Fig. 1 Values of the doubling time for the growth rate of wealth δη (Eq. 8) versus the doubling time for
wealth itself δX (Eq. 7). Select years are shown for reference.
Table 2 Forecasted growth rates for energy consumption rates a, wealth C, global production P and carbon
dioxide emission rates E . The value ε is a quantity much smaller than the associated rate. Financial quantities
are with respect to inflation-adjusted MER units.
a C P E
Growth rate (% yr−1) 2.3 2.3 2.3+ε 2.3
Doubling time (yr) 30 30 30−ε 30
In the meantime, one can take advantage of recent stagnation in innovation to make
simplified near-term forecasts for the growth of the human system and its CO2 emissions
(Table 2). Assuming persistence, on average, global energy consumption rates and wealth
will continue to grow at a rate of about 2.3% per year, or a doubling time of 30 years.
Assuming that global decarbonization continues to be extremely slow [20], the same rate
will apply to global emissions of CO2, E. From Eq. 4, global real GDP will grow at a
rate that is only marginally faster than the growth rate for wealth, since the innovation rate
d lnη/dt is approaching zero.
As a strong word of caution, persistence is never something to carry too far. As a guess,
the rates provide in Table 2 apply only for timescales significantly less than the wealth dou-
bling time of 30 years. Essentially the future is unknowable, and unforeseen catastrophes or
boons cannot be excluded. Equally, exponential growth cannot continue unabated because,
sooner or later, civilization must face up to resource depletion or environmental degradation.
74 Conclusions
Sometimes one sees the naive argument that climate scientists are presumptuous to make
long-range forecasts of climate when short-term weather forecasts are so often wrong. What
makes climate forecasts possible is top-down energetic constraints. It is not necessary to
explicitly model weather in order to make long-term forecasts of globally-averaged sur-
face temperatures. With certain assumptions about relative humidity and clouds, the key
ingredients for a simple 1D radiative-convective equilibrium climate model are the rate of
solar energetic input, and the concentration of greenhouse gases [17]. Long-range predic-
tions of regional climate variability require greater sophistication. But even here, top-down
constraints dictate the plausible range of climatolological parameter space [9].
Scher and Koomey (2011) have argued that “Economic systems are not the same as
physical systems, and we shouldn’t model them as if they are”. Nonetheless, civilization is
part of the physical universe. As with climate and weather, its evolution should also be con-
strained by global scale energetic flows. The evidence presented here and in Garrett (2011)
suggests that it is indeed possible to make long-term forecasts of global energy consumption
rates, without having to explicitly model the internal, short-term details of people and their
lifestyles. Long-range forecasts of energy consumption by specific countries or economic
sectors will be more difficult [22] and require additional sophistication. But, from the stand-
point of determining emission rates of a long-lived gas such as CO2, the internal details are
largely irrelevant. So long as there is atmospheric mixing and international trade, it is only
global scale energy consumption and CO2 emissions that matter.
The main point made in Garrett (2011) was that the global economy can be placed on a
physical footing, through a constant coefficient that links economic wealth (not wealth pro-
duction) to the global consumption rate of primary energy resources. The relevant physics
is still too primitive to provide a fully deterministic solution into the future. Still, as argued
here, one can apply the principle of persistence based on recent trends, provided one is
looking at quantities that are highly integrated over space and time. Just as one might make
the purely statistical argument that recent trends in globally-averaged surface temperatures
will continue into the near future, here it is suggested that near-term growth in economic
wealth and energy consumption rates will also persist. The qualification is that the growth
will not be super-exponential, as it has been in past decades, but more purely exponential.
The forecasted growth rate is about 2.3 % per year.
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